

# **Exhibit 15**

**Excerpts of SW-SEC00031653**

**From:** Krajcir, Robert [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=26414B37173741E09B795763D9ADA51D-KRAJCIR, RO]  
**Sent:** 8/30/2018 3:14:57 PM  
**To:** Taylor, Brody [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=71bea8d4ba2b4cf987d83d5ca8710846-Taylor, Bro]; Cline, Brad [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=c1da7afa0bce413f9c32ce66040660f3-Cline, Brad]  
**CC:** Quitugua, Eric [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=227693e84bc0400b84364660f692bc85-Quitugua, E]; Trebacz, Marek [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=40b8e8d595274bc88506232551df513a-Trebacz, Ma]; Kenneally, Jonathan [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=d039a086eac64dec81834f18ca486dad-Kenneally,]; Straub, Carol [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=18af4e35519d4f259ed12f407ada725f-Straub, Car]; Pierce, Charles [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=8821c5f3c8734a3fbd33de946353d52b-Pierce, Cha]; Sejna, Tomas [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=0f1c6bd3d32f4ca0966247ae2386cc56-Sejna, Toma]; Murray, Joe [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=13b5b9a696a44963a928819f1732caf6-Murray, Joe]; Henry, Jonathan [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=6edbe5d0a713413d9e003350861120bc-Henry, Jona]  
**Subject:** RE: Machine certificate authentication - BYOD solution  
**Attachments:** BYOD.pptx

Hello all,

First of all, big thank you for coming and sharing your ideas on this topic. Please find attached the presentation I used today, so you can show it to anyone you deem appropriate.

I also summarized some ideas that I have heard today, so it will be easier for you to recall what we discussed:

- *Certificates issued via GPO/SCCM, there already are some, but Marek can deploy even more if needed*
- *from security perspective we also need a proper written policy first to support us*
- *will HD have capacity to support all users once they won't have admin rights? Marek presented idea that user can be redirected to portal every time, even when downloading unlicensed/unsupported software*
- *bring this to attention of senior management, start from higher level – Brody, Brad*
- *multiple IT teams involved - do the thing as a project, show the presentation to CIO (Rany)*
- *consider to start implementing/deploying new systems without full admin rights, and do the rest during refreshes, or in waves*

*attendees – Robert Krajcir (Network), Charles Pierce (Network), Joe Murray (Systems), Tomas Sejna (InfoSec), Eric Quitugua (InfoSec), Marek Trebacz (SCCM guru :), Jonathan Kenneally (HD/SDM), Carol Straub (HD/compliance)*

Best regards,

Robert



**Róbert Krajčír | Network Engineer**

Office: +420 511 12 6277 | Cell: +420 775 395 043

**From:** Krajcir, Robert

**Sent:** Friday, August 24, 2018 11:13

**To:** Taylor, Brody <brody.taylor@solarwinds.com>; Murray, Joe <Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com>; Henry, Jonathan <jonathan.henry@solarwinds.com>

**Cc:** Quitugua, Eric <eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com>; OConnell, Tara <Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com>; Trebacz, Marek <Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com>; Kenneally, Jonathan <Jonathan.Kenneally@solarwinds.com>; Straub, Carol <carol.straub@solarwinds.com>; Cline, Brad <brad.cline@solarwinds.com>; Pierce, Charles <charles.pierce@solarwinds.com>; Masar, Marek <Marek.Masar@solarwinds.com>

**Subject:** RE: Machine certificate authentication

Hello all,

I would like to drag your attention back to this topic.

Implementing certificates is essential to enforce proper security policies not only on VPN, but also on corporate wireless, to properly address BYOD problem. We see every day, that people are accessing our corporate wifi with their smartphones or other devices that are not joined in the domain – **this seems to be common practice !!!** While we do not have any control over such device (proper antivirus, NetScope, OS updates etc.), it can easily reach any resource on any port on our corporate or swdev network.

To summarize the **risk we are facing**:

- Anyone with AD credentials can access our corporate wifi or corporate VPN from ANY device, no matter if company owned or not
- While on corporate wifi, or VPN, such device can basically do whatever without us detecting it until it's too late:
  - o It can easily download any content without being detected by NetScope, which is normally installed on all domain PCs
  - o it can compromise entire network by spreading malware (spyware, viruses, trojans, ransomware), because we cannot ensure that such device will be fully compliant in terms of OS updates, antivirus, software installed etc.

I do not want to look like panicking, but I hope I do not have to explain what would be the impact on this company, if someone connects non-domain PC or phone with ransomware like WannaCry into our network. Even though we will be able to see who's AD credentials were used to access the network, it will be to very little use once we will have to deal with stolen or encrypted data or malware epidemic, especially when we know that sometimes people are leaving the company, but their AD creds remain active for few more days.

I would like to emphasize, that we need to get some solution together as soon as possible. For the one I proposed, we would need to:

- trim down user admin rights, so that they won't be able to export certificates on their PC
- enroll certificates
- set VPN and wireless policies to accept only devices with valid certificate, and with valid AD credentials

I would like to schedule a call about this with all interested parties to agree on some action plan, so that we can get things moving. Let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Best regards,

Robert



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**From:** Krajcir, Robert

**Sent:** Thursday, June 7, 2018 18:37

**To:** Taylor, Brody <[brody.taylor@solarwinds.com](mailto:brody.taylor@solarwinds.com)>; Murray, Joe <[Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com](mailto:Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com)>; Cline, Brad <[brad.cline@solarwinds.com](mailto:brad.cline@solarwinds.com)>

**Cc:** Quitugua, Eric <[eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com](mailto:eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com)>; OConnell, Tara <[Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com](mailto:Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com)>; Trebacz, Marek <[Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com](mailto:Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com)>; Kenneally, Jonathan <[Jonathan.Kenneally@solarwinds.com](mailto:Jonathan.Kenneally@solarwinds.com)>; Straub, Carol <[carol.straub@solarwinds.com](mailto:carol.straub@solarwinds.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Machine certificate authentication on GlobalProtect VPN

Hi Brody,

That is a good question. At this moment, it seems it is everyone. Looking at the membership in AD groups, most of SWI employees can use the VPN. Yes, I believe there are groups of users who do not need access to on-premise resources at all, but I do not know how to determine which groups.

Best regards,

Robert



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**From:** Taylor, Brody


**Sent:** Wednesday, June 6, 2018 22:55

**To:** Krajcir, Robert <[robert.krajcir@solarwinds.com](mailto:robert.krajcir@solarwinds.com)>; Murray, Joe <[Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com](mailto:Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com)>; Cline, Brad <[brad.cline@solarwinds.com](mailto:brad.cline@solarwinds.com)>

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**Subject:** RE: Machine certificate authentication on GlobalProtect VPN

Dumb question, who are the user segments needing to access our domain assets post O365 / SharePoint?



**Brody Taylor | Director ITSM & EUS | SolarWinds**

Office: 512.682.9320 | Mobile: 512.652.8345

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**From:** Krajcir, Robert

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 5, 2018 8:23 AM

**To:** Murray, Joe <[Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com](mailto:Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com)>; Cline, Brad <[brad.cline@solarwinds.com](mailto:brad.cline@solarwinds.com)>; IT HD Leads <[ithelpdeskleads@solarwinds.com](mailto:ithelpdeskleads@solarwinds.com)>; Trebacz, Marek <[Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com](mailto:Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com)>; OConnell, Tara



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Cc: Network Team <[NetworkTeam@solarwinds.com](mailto:NetworkTeam@solarwinds.com)>

Subject: RE: Machine certificate authentication on GlobalProtect VPN

Hey Joe,

Thanks for your email.

Yes, I agree that we have a lot to consider, that is why I have started this discussion at the first place. However, I would like to move our environment a bit further, as the only other option is to do nothing.

Regarding your concern – let me explain my vision a bit further. There should be two groups (or eventually more) of users:

Users accessing our VPN from company-owned device – should use machine certificate to authenticate their PC, should possess unlimited access (as if they were in the office)

Other users – should still have an option to connect to VPN, but their profile should have stricter policy and tier access should be limited. Also the number of gateways can be lower, i.e. just a few per region – Austin, Lehi/Denver, Ottawa, Cork, Brno, Manila, Singapore...

There could be also separate groups for vendors, contractors etc., depending on how many levels of restriction will be required.

So in my point of view, vendors, or non-domain computers in general should not have unrestricted access to our network, and thus should fall under one of the restricted categories that does not need any certificates. As for acquisitions – this initiative should motivate them to join tier PC to domain, especially laptops. Workstations that are always in the office do not matter, as there they are protected by our firewalls all the time. However, laptops, that can be carried away are what matters – if they are not in the domain, we cannot control their security outside of our network.

One other challenge is to issue a certificate to each machine in the domain, so it will not be exportable (user will not be able to read the private key), otherwise it would be easy to copy the certificate from one machine to other and bypass the entire idea. Question also is whether to create unique certs for each machine (i.e. bound to hostname, preferred method), or use one universal (wildcard one) and distribute everywhere.

@Tara, Marek – are we able to push certificates to machines so that users won't be able to export them / read private key? Will we need to trim user rights to achieve this?

Best regards,

Robert



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**From:** Murray, Joe

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 5, 2018 9:28

**To:** Krajcir, Robert <[robert.krajcir@solarwinds.com](mailto:robert.krajcir@solarwinds.com)>; Cline, Brad <[brad.cline@solarwinds.com](mailto:brad.cline@solarwinds.com)>; IT HD Leads <[ithelpdeskleads@solarwinds.com](mailto:ithelpdeskleads@solarwinds.com)>; Trebacz, Marek <[Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com](mailto:Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com)>; OConnell, Tara <[Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com](mailto:Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com)>; Quitugua, Eric <[eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com](mailto:eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com)>

**Cc:** Network Team <[NetworkTeam@solarwinds.com](mailto:NetworkTeam@solarwinds.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Machine certificate authentication on GlobalProtect VPN

Hi Robert,

I agree with the reasoning, however, I think it is needed as is for now.

Between vendors and all the acquisitions, we utilize VPN a lot for off domain computers (in fact they can be very reliant on it).

If Infosec would really like this looked at further, we could discuss possible ways to implement, but I think we have a lot to consider.

**Note:** if we did proceed, the root cert is already on all domain joined computers. It would just mean issuing a cert from our internal CA which would only take 2 minutes.

Thanks,

Joe

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**From:** Krajcir, Robert

**Sent:** Monday 4 June 2018 15:49

**To:** Cline, Brad <[brad.cline@solarwinds.com](mailto:brad.cline@solarwinds.com)>; IT HD Leads <[ithelpdeskleads@solarwinds.com](mailto:ithelpdeskleads@solarwinds.com)>; Trebacz, Marek <[Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com](mailto:Marek.Trebacz@solarwinds.com)>; OConnell, Tara <[Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com](mailto:Tara.OConnell@solarwinds.com)>; Quitugua, Eric <[eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com](mailto:eric.quitugua@solarwinds.com)>

**Cc:** Network Team <[NetworkTeam@solarwinds.com](mailto:NetworkTeam@solarwinds.com)>; Murray, Joe <[Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com](mailto:Joe.Murray@solarwinds.com)>

**Subject:** Machine certificate authentication on GlobalProtect VPN

Hello all,

By this initiative, I would like to address following problem:

These days, we are in process of firewall cleanup and optimization, which showed us a security gap we are facing with our VPN service. As GlobalProtect VPN client is publicly available for download, it is no problem for almost any user to download it to any PC they like, and log in to our VPN from 3<sup>rd</sup> party device – without Netskope, proper Antivirus, security patches or updates etc. This is not only a major drawback from opening access to our network via VPN completely (as we intend to in the future, as it will be required by teleworkers, on business trips etc.), but I guess we all will also agree, that it is not very secure for resources currently accessible via VPN and data stored there, especially considering stricter legislation such as GDPR.

What I propose:

Use certificates for machine authentication. Basically it would mean, that users will only be able to connect to our VPN from verified/trusted devices, that are under IT control, joined the domain, are properly updated and have the required software properly installed and in use. For everyone else, there could be one or two separate VPN gateways per region with stricter policy (access to less resources).

What do we need:

As far as I have researched, there are no additional costs associated with implementing certificates. We do not need additional licenses or hardware. Joe also informed me, that we already have our internal CA server that can be used for this purpose. So what we need to do is basically this:

- configure new connection profiles on our firewalls,
- import root certificate on the firewall
- Issue, push and install certificates to client machines – i.e. in waves via SCCM, or let users download manually from a server accessible only from office... subject to further discussion

- Implement a pilot (i.e. all IT people as testers)
- Roll out to all users
- Create/modify the policies for access from corporate devices and from 3<sup>rd</sup> party devices

The reason why I am writing this email:

I would like to get inputs from you folks, especially your thoughts on the solution itself, on how exactly to push the certificates to user machines, how the support should look like, testing period etc. Feel free to comment or forward to anyone who may be interested but I accidentally omitted him/her from the recipient list.

Thank you!

Best regards,

Robert



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
## BYOD solution, Machine certificate authentication

Robert Krajcir, August 2018

7/30/2021

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Mention situation I witnessed in AMS and BUC

We cannot track windows devices

Torrenting software has been found on several laptops by HD recently

Many PCs not in the domain

7/30/2021

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## RISKS FOR COMPANY

## Summary and evaluation



- **Unmanaged (non-domain) machines summary:**
  - We have no control over critical device features:
    - Antivirus
    - OS updates
    - NetScope
    - Installed software
    - Applications running
  - Possess the same level of access as all other devices in CORP zone
    - Can reach any resource on any port (exc. DMZ, HIGHSECURITY zones etc.)
    - Access from CORP VPN is a bit restricted
  - Capable of doing anything to our core systems
    - Can be weak spot in our network (old OS, or obsolete updates)
    - May serve as unintentional back door access to our core systems if infected
    - Spread malware
    - Access resources (code, databases...)
    - Can upload code or GDPR sensitive data outside (no NetScope)
- **Worst-case scenarios for the company:**
  - **Data theft**
    - GDPR – sensitive data (employees, customers...)
    - Code or other intellectual property
    - Strategic documents (future acquisitions, stock market documents etc.)
  - **Malware infection**
    - Ransomware (Wannacry)
    - Viruses, Trojans, backdoor access
  - In all cases there will be major reputation and financial loss to the company

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7/30/2021

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## RISKS FOR COMPANY

Possible scenarios

<p><b>Outside attack</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Phishing attack           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Attacker gets AD credentials</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Connection to corporate wireless or corporate VPN</li> <li>3. Access to resources           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Depends on account group membership</li> <li>▪ Fileshares</li> <li>▪ Bitbucket/Artifactory</li> <li>▪ Sharepoint</li> <li>▪ SolarHR</li> </ul> </li> <li>4. Consequences           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Data theft</li> <li>▪ Disclosure</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> <li>▪ Installs backdoor</li> <li>▪ Intentional malware release</li> <li>▪ Get info for future attacks</li> <li>▪ ...</li> <li>▪ Nobody notices</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<p><b>Infected device</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Device is infected outside of SWI network           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Personal use</li> <li>▪ OS not patched properly</li> <li>▪ Antivirus missing or obsolete</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Device connects to SWI network via wireless or VPN</li> <li>3. Malware spreads automatically           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Email</li> <li>▪ Teams</li> <li>▪ Local network</li> <li>▪ ...</li> </ul> </li> <li>4. Consequences           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Encrypted files</li> <li>▪ Attacks from our IP addresses outside</li> <li>▪ Data theft</li> <li>▪ Backdoor</li> <li>▪ ...</li> </ul> </li> </ol>
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It is only matter of time until someone finds out, some may even know. Hackers can be very creative  
 Scenario 1 – all devices vulnerable, targets on user weakness, then avoids our security mechanisms like NetScope  
 Phishing attack on One-Note like Tim Brown specified on all-hands. Risk is even bigger if done by someone who knows the environment – former employee who was fired, someone who overheard a conversation, friend of an employee etc.  
 Attacker does not have to be in the office, just somewhere nearby  
 Take into consideration what could have been done just using the vulnerability in dnsstuff

Scenario 2 – devices that are not in the domain are vulnerable to threats even if user has good intentions  
 Firewall antivirus or threat prevention mechanisms apply only when the malware / suspicious traffic is crossing firewall – in AUS, BRN, KRA offices multiple networks can be compromised without any filtering

7/30/2021

PLAN FUTURE STEPS
solarwinds 

- What to do with the risk described?
  - Accept
  - Suppress to acceptable level
  - Mitigate completely
- Aerohive WAP depolyment
  - In progress
  - Affects only corporate wireless, not VPN
  - Does not cover Windows devices
  - It will take a lot of time and resources to deploy everywhere
- Implement proper security policies
  - Firewall cleanup is in finish line
  - Decide how to treat offices like London or Japan
- Implement BYOD policy and enforce it
  - 2F authentication
  - Device certificates
  - Tools like ISE, ACS, NAC...
  - ...
  - Any ideas?

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This is what we need to discuss after what was presented in slides before

We already know that we cannot rely on some handbooks or guidelines – BYOD policies have to be enforced

Need to prevent non-company devices to easily access our network – how to achieve this?

London/Japan – firewalls which allow access to SWI network, but we have no visibility of what connects behind

7/30/2021

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7/30/2021

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